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tance. But to-day we know that far from being tainted by their metaphysical connexions, they have actually contributed most toward stripping psychology of its metaphysical character.

And now as to the position of Fechner's metaphysical system in the history of philosophy. Philosophy, according to Professor Wundt, is not an absolutely definite conception. There are two distinct species of thought traceable throughout all the history of philosophy. The first species seeks to epitomise the science of its time and to crystallise it into a systematic conception of the universe. Most perfect in this respect was the philosophy of Aristotle, in which the science of antiquity was focussed, and which dominated human thought for many, many centuries. Next in order, perfection, and influence were the systems of Descartes and Kant. The second species of philosophy, on the other hand, does not strive to be rigorously positive and scientific; but, dissatisfied with the results of purely rational thought, it seeks to construct its concepts of the universe by the aid of the imagination, and so aims to satisfy the longings of the heart, and to cast its searching eyes beyond the bounds which patient and plodding inquiry have marked out. This species of philosophy is wedded to poetry, and carries thought back to its ultimate source, in the mythological imagination. The greatest thinker of antiquity, Plato, took refuge in philosophical poetry and mythology wherever rigorous thought failed him; and it is the opinion of some that on this side of its development his system has been greatest and most effective. It is to this second species of philosophy that Fechner's system belongs,—to the domain of poetry and mythology combined. Philosophy for him was a matter of belief, not of knowledge. And if the philosophical offspring of poesy and fantasy be entitled to any rank and recognition in the republic of thought, as most will say they are, then Fechner's philosophy too may justly lay claim to lasting position and consideration. Such is Professor Wundt's view.

The present brochure, which is an address delivered in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of Fechner's birth, contains as a frontispiece a photogravure of the monument erected to Fechner's memory in the Rosenthal at Leipzig; and in addition to Professor Wundt's excellent sketch of Fechner's philosophical significance contains matter in the way of personal recollections and expositions of Fechner's psychology and esthetics and of Fechner's relations to spiritualism, that are new and consequently will be of interest to the public. u.

THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTION AND OTHER ESSAYS. Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism. By *G. H. Howison, LL. D.*, Mills Professor of Philosophy in the University of California. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1901. Pages, xxxv, 396.

It is pleasant to compare the work of Professor Howison with the ordinary run of professional philosophical treatises. Where they (and most notably the Continental books) scarcely ever deign to give the inquiring reader the least clue to their

contents and purpose, he has given us in an admirable preface a precise summary of his doctrine, and has added so excellent an index and analytical table of contents that no one can be pardoned for miscomprehending his philosophy. The book is a collection of essays on topics bearing such titles as "The Limits of Evolution," "Modern Science and Pantheism," "Later German Philosophy," "The Art Principle as Represented in Poetry," "The Right Relation of Reason to Religion," "Human Immortality," "The Harmony of Determinism and Freedom,"—all apparently of a divergent character, but having withal a common and definite trend of thought applied to all the main concerns of human life, viz., to science, art, and religion.

Professor Howison has given his metaphysical theory the title of Personal Idealism. As to the objection to the epithet *personal*, he replies "that the actual history of philosophic thought, even after philosophy attains to the view that rational consciousness is the First Principle, exhibits a singular arrest of the movement toward putting complete personality at the centre of things. Historic idealism is, in fact, far from being personal; rather, it is well-nigh overwhelmingly impersonal." In its search after unity, the ideal of the monistic system, philosophy, whether materialistic or idealistic, he contends has always lost sight of its other interests, of which some are at least as great. The prevailing tendency has always been toward some form of monism, the absorption of all things, including individual minds, either in a single material Substance or in a single conscious Subject. Leibnitz alone, in the long history of idealistic thinking, has broken with the monistic tradition. The main drift of philosophic thought in the Western world for the past century has, surprising as it may seem, been increasingly toward the Oriental view of things, and has been at direct variance with the Occidental's instinctive preference for personal initiative responsibility and credit; and Professor Howison accordingly declares himself glad of an opportunity "to protest with him against this all-engulfing monism, fatal to our moral freedom even when taking on the plausible form of monistic idealism." Even idealistic monism, which he regards as a real philosophic advance on other forms of monism, is irreconcilable with personality; it annuls moral agencies and personal freedom in all conscious beings other than its so-called god, and so leaves its professed god without so much as a vestige of genuine personality. Now, it is the aim of the present collection of essays, says Professor Howison, to present "an idealistic system that shall be thoroughly personal in the sense just implied. Instead of any monism, these essays put forward a Pluralism: they advocate an eternal or metaphysical world of *many* minds, all alike possessing personal initiative, real self-direction, instead of an all-predestinating single Mind that alone has real free-agency."

In Professor Howison's philosophy, the ideal is central and determinative, the measure of all other reality. A composite of suggestions derived from Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Kant, this philosophy has pushed the idealistic, as well as the individualistic, principles to their furthest limits. We shall give in a few dogmatic

statements, in Professor Howison's own words, a summary of his position with regard to the great metaphysical problems.

All existence, he says, is either (1) *the existence of minds*, or (2) *the existence of the items and order of their experience*. Time and space, thus, owe their existence to the essential correlation and coexistence of minds. The mutual recognition of all minds as alike self-determining renders their coexistence *a moral order*. "These many minds, being in this mutual recognition of their moral reality the determining ground of all events and all mere 'things,' form the eternal (i. e., unconditionally real) world; and by a fitting metaphor, consecrated in the usage of ages, they may be said to constitute the 'City of God.' . . . The members of this Eternal Republic have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other, including thus their primary reference to God. . . . They have no origin at all—no source in *time* whatever. . . . They simply *are*, and together constitute the eternal order. They exist only in and through their mutually thought correlation, their eternal 'City,' and out of it would be non-existent. But through their thought-reciprocity with each other, God being included in the circle, they are the ground of all literally originated, all temporal and spatial existences. Hence, relatively to the natural world, they are free, in the sense of being in control of it: so far from being found by it and its laws, they are the very source of all the law there is or can be in it. Relatively to God also, and to each other, all minds other than God are free, in the still higher sense that nothing but their own light and conviction determines their actions toward each other or toward God. . . . This Pluralism held in union by reason, this World of Spirits, is thus the genuine *Unmoved One that moves all Things*. . . . Its oneness is not that of a single inflexible Unit, leaving no room for freedom in the many, for a many that is really many, but is the oneness of uniting harmony, of spontaneous coöperation, in which every member, from inner initiative, from native contemplation of the same Ideal, joins in moving all things changeable toward the common goal. This movement of things changeable toward the goal of a common Ideal is what we have in these days learned to call the process of Evolution. The World of Spirits, as the ground of it, can therefore neither be the product of evolution nor in any way subject to evolution."

As to creation, it is not an event, an act causative and effective in time; it is simply "such an eternal dependence of other souls upon God that the non-existence of God would involve the non-existence of all souls, while his existence is the essential supplementing Reality that raises them to reality; without him, they would be but void names and bare possibilities."

After the preceding statements, one will not be surprised to learn that the key to the whole view is to be found in its system of causation, which substitutes final cause for efficient cause; final cause being not merely the guiding and regulative, but actually the grounding and constitutive, principle of all real existence. A more absolute idealism it would be impossible to conceive. It solves admirably, for instance, the problem of personal freedom, but its solutions are entirely metaphys-

ical, and the system generally is unsupported by positive research. In this sense, we can scarcely see that Professor Howison's metaphysical predications concerning the nature of the moral order, the city of God, the interrelations of God and the individual minds, the process of evolution, the nature of creation, etc., are less "assumptions" than Berkeley's flat and unqualified postulation of a Divine Mind supporting and containing individual spirits. True, there is much more ado about the process by which the assumptions are reached; the reader is "led" to the assumptions through what Professor Howison terms "a logical continuum," and by means of a "transcendental principle." But analysis will show that ultimately Berkeley's position is just as well grounded, is just as rich in implications as Professor Howison's, not to speak of its being far simpler.

Much is to be said of Professor Howison's treatment, however, for the insight which it gives into the methods and the state of modern metaphysical speculation, and for his brief historical exposition of the views of Hartmann, Lange, and Dühring, the latter of whom is not as well known to American readers as he should be. The work may indeed be studied with profit by all students of metaphysics. μ.

THE PROBLEM OF CONDUCT. A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics. By *Alfred Edward Taylor*, Assistant Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy at the Owens College, Manchester; Late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1901. Pages, vi, 501. Price, \$3.25.

Mr. Taylor has given us in this volume a searching and comprehensive examination of the ethical problem, and has shown in his *résumés* and discussions generally a thorough mastery of the world's literature as well as its philosophy. The book is substantially the same as that which obtained the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in the University of Oxford for the year 1899, although it is far from agreeing in every point with the doctrines of the eminent English thinker in whose memory the prize in question was founded. We shall endeavor to indicate Mr. Taylor's position with respect to the main question of philosophy, the question of method, which here chiefly concerns us, by a few quotations; we shall see that his work has many sound elements to recommend it.

"All knowledge," he says, "according to our view, is empirical in the sense of being concerned in the last resort with the description of matters of fact or experience. But not all the branches of study treat the experienced facts which it is their business to ascertain and describe in one and the same way. The attitude of each of the ordinary departmental sciences to the great body of experienced facts which make up the life of the world may be said to be characterised at once by more or less strict limitation of range of vision, and by the endeavor, within a limited range, to take account of all important or typical facts. Comparative narrowness of range and accompanying fulness of detail within that range, these are the distinctive marks of the sciences which are called sometimes natural, some-